Nuclear Conflict as a Game of Hawk and Dove
Over the past few months there has been increasing tension between the United States and North Korea over the latter’s development of its nuclear program. After years of testing, North Korea now claims to have missiles capable of reaching cities in the continental United States. In response to threats from North Korea’s Kim Jong-un, President Donald Trump of the United States promised to “launch fire and fury” if attacked. While this buildup of catastrophic weapons paired with threatening language may seem irrational, Oliver Roeder of FiveThirtyEight argues that the actions of both nations leaders conform to models in game theory.
Roeder compares the threat of nuclear war to the game of chicken, in which two drivers drive towards each other at high speeds, each daring the other to pull out. Although they risk tremendous loss should they collide, the driver who stays in the longest wins a small victory in pride and bragging rights. Similarly, Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un both face tremendous risk should nuclear war occur: their nations would be destroyed. However, by staying in the game longer and intimidating their opponent, they each increase their chances of winning the conflict and having the other back down. As such, Donald Trump’s radical language and Kim Jong-un’s continued threats and weapons tests (including one involving a missile over Japan) serve to project their commitment to the conflict, and are attempts at forcing the other to withdraw. In context, both leaders are acting rationally in attempt to gain the upper hand.
This game is almost identical to the hawk-dove game we covered in lecture. If both players play hawk (which in this case equates to continued threats and testing) eventually both sides face dramatic loss (in the form of nuclear war). However, if one leader can force the other into position of dove, then war is averted and a Nash Equilibrium is obtained. However, neither player wants to assume the dove position in this equilibrium, since it will lead to a lower payoff in the form of a lower standing internationally.
However, although in the context of this game Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un may be acting rationally, Roeder goes on to question the rationale behind the game itself. He points out that the United States may have a lot more to lose from nuclear war, and little to gain from entering this specific conflict. I agree, since the loss in payoff of playing dove, and avoiding direct confrontation is small compared to the incredible risk of playing chicken with an unpredictable, nuclear armed foreign leader. Before further escalating United States commitment to conflict, Donald Trump should reevaluate the payoff matrix and consider taking a small loss to avoid a major one.
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-to-win-a-nuclear-standoff/