Doves over the Aegean Sea
One approach to unveil high rate of arms proliferation around the world is to use the game theory, specifically the Dove-Hawk game. Suppose two countries are taking part in the dove-hawk game where they simultaneously choose whether to be aggressive or passive towards each other in their respective foreign policies. Each country hopes to establish its dominance and take control of more resources and land by being aggressive, however if both act aggressively they risk actually going to war. On the other hand if both acts passively, their gain compared to both being aggressive will be substantially higher but less than the case one can dominate the other.
In 1974, after Turkey’s military intervention to curtail Greek aggression in Cyprus, both countries took the “hawk” position against each other and exponentially increased their military expenditure over the years. Especially throughout the 1980s and 1990s, as the Hellenic Armed Forces (HAF) tried to keep up with Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), the Greece had to spent 6.3% of its GNP compared TAF’s estimated 3.6 percent, Italy’s 1.7 percent, and the United States’ 4.9 percent. Unfortunately, Greece’s high military expenditure took one of the leading roles to contribute to its recent economical crisis. At the same time, the countries lending money to Greece, especially France and Germany, while asking the Greek government to cut their expenditure on many subjects were not eager to impose the same conditions on the defense budget as Greece was one of their main defense products customers in Europe.
As we can see after assuming the “hawk” position, Turkey and especially Greece suffered fiscal hardships without being able to assert their dominance over each other and failing to gain any more land or resources compared to 1974. Upon realizing that, by assuming the “hawk” position Greece and Turkey were hurting themselves and letting 3rd countries to profit from the mutual aggression, decided to come together and sign a deal. Both countries starting by 2000s assumed “dove” position and decreased their military spending.
As we can see from the above discussion, Turkey and Greece by mutually trusting and agreeing with each other was able to obtain a state which does not qualify as a Nash equilibrium but maximizes gain for each country without going to war or spending money on military equipment to make other countries richer. On the other hand, as Nash equilibrium is not achieved, the agreement between Greece and Turkey is volatile and carries the risk of falling apart easily.
Links:
- https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/apr/19/greece-military-spending-debt-crisis
- http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/gr-budget.htm