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Game Theory and the Iranian Nuclear Program

Tensions between Israel and Iran have grown precipitously in recent weeks, as the Middle East teeters on the brink of another potential conflict.  Iran has been ratcheting up its nuclear program and Israel has been trying to marshal support for a preemptive strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities.  This article demonstrates the power of game theory, and Nash Equilibria and how it can be used to relate to foreign policy.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recently spoke at the UN and set “red lines” for Iran.  These “red lines” establish the conditions under which Israel will launch a military strike against the Iranian military.  Netanyahu also tried to present evidence that would make it beneficial for the U.S. and other western nations to follow Israel’s “red lines.”

Below is a simplified game theory setup for Netanyahu’s strategy.  In his ideal scenario the U.S. and the West would have the highest ‘payout’ if their strategies of engagement were aligned with Israel’s strategy.  In other words, Netanyahu is trying to form a Nash Equilibrium of foreign policy responses whereby if Israel attacks Iran, it is in the U.S. and the West’s best interest to, as well.  Likewise, if it is not in Israel’s best interest to attack then neither will the U.S. and the West.  There is also the possibility that Israel attacks while the U.S. and the West do not.  This would give Israel a negative payout as it would have to bear all of the costs of a strike against Iran.  The U.S. and the West would also get a negative payout as they would lose an ally in the Middle East (this scenario is far more complex but is simplified for the purposes of this blog).  For the purposes of simplification, I am stating that there is no scenario where Israel does not attack and the U.S. and the West do.

The top actor is the U.S. and the West while the side is Israel.  The left option is “Attack” and the right option is “Don’t Attack.”  The top option is “Attack” and the bottom option is “Don’t Attack.”

+,+ -,-
–,– +,+

 

 

 

 

Netanyahu believes that if Israel is able to gain a coalition against Iran, then Iran will believe that it is not in their best interest to continue the program.  In this Nash equilibrium, Israel will have a coalition threatening to attack and Iran will discontinue its program without a shot having been fired.  Israel and the coalition achieve its highest individual payout because it gets Iran to discontinue its nuclear program and Iran achieves its highest payout because it does not get attacked.  Israel gets a negative payout if it does not gain a coalition to attack and Iran continues its program.  If the coalition is forced to attack because Iran refuses to halt its program (thus continuing it) both sides get a negative payout as they will be thrust into an armed conflict.  For the purposes of simplification I am stating that there is no scenario where Israel does not gain a coalition ready to attack and Iran discontinues its nuclear program.  The article aptly states that this strategy was used during the 1961 Cuban Missile Crisis when the USSR removed its missiles from Cuba after it perceived a genuine threat from the West.

The top actor is the Iranian Nuclear Program and the side actor is Israel and its Coalition.  The left option is “Continue Nuclear Program” and the right option is “Discontinue Nuclear Program.”  The top option is “Attack” and the bottom option is “Don’t Attack.”

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-,+ –,–

 

 

 

 

The figures shown above demonstrate how foreign policy can be related to game theory.  However, as the article states, game theory should not be used to dictate foreign policy, as it can be difficult to convince other countries to follow the same “red lines” as another.  In this instance, Obama has been relatively unmoved by Israel’s hawkish arguments thus making it more difficult for Israel to achieve its perception of a Nash Equilibrium.  Though the conflict with Iran is more complex than mere pluses and minuses, this has shown game theory’s relevance in international politics.

Article: http://www.israeldefense.com/?CategoryID=483&ArticleID=1663

–CT Senior

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