September 8, 2012
by Annelise Riles

The emerging academic consensus on the future of financial regulation

I am in Freiburg, Germany for a conference at the Max-Planck Institute on Regulation and Law Enforcement after the financial crisis.  Freiburg is the greenest city in Germany, I am told proudly by our hosts: 100% of the energy used in the city comes from renewable sources. Everywhere you see small systems installed in the streams to collect little bits of energy that are pooled to supply local energy needs.  Even visitors are supplied with a public transport pass on hotel check-in and advised to take the tram, bicycle or walk to our appointments. The air is clean and crisp and, in marked contrast to my own country, people look remarkably fit and relaxed. If Freiburg can do it, why not Ithaca?


At the conference, I can sense a palpable shift in the way scholars are beginning to think about the financial crisis as compared to several years ago. There is a breadth of approaches–geography, sociology, anthropology, experimental psychology, criminology–and scholars are engaging in direct, detailed and fruitful conversation with practitioners.  Everyone seems to have far more patience for approaches and perspectives different from their own–perhaps we have all been chastened by the limits of our own disciplinary viewpoints! The practitioners themselves are more diverse in their views than in the past.  Some think the government is doing a great job, but others (including former government regulators) have an extremely dark and pessimistic view of how things are going on the inside, and they are not afraid to say so. The consensus of the conference was clearly that, four years after the start of the financial crisis, we have not made nearly enough progress in making the kinds of regulatory and institutional changes needed to prevent the next one.  We joked that each of us outdid the next in our presentations with ever-darker pictures of the political impediments to regulatory reform, the structural problems such as a lack of self-confidence and incentives against forceful action among regulators and prosecutors, and the limits of the securities and criminal laws for addressing problematic behavior. I talked about a different level of problem–the rise since 2008 of a new mode of state managerialism I call Market Totalitarianism (which gives you a sense of what I think of it!) More on that in a next post.


But the real reason I am posting here is that I met a remarkable young legal anthropologist, Johanna Mugler, who is just beginning her teaching career at the University of Bern and working on the politics and epistemology of taxation.  She told me what this blog means to her and her students and chided me for not posting more frequently as of late! It’s an honor to have a conversation anywhere with imaginative young scholars like Johanna–and if this blog can be a venue of that kind of conversation with so many readers like her, well, that is all the inspiration I need to get cracking again. Thank you, Johanna!

January 18, 2012
by Annelise Riles

Broadening the methods for studying financial regulation

In my earlier post I discussed some ways we need to broaden the subject of financial
regulation.  Doing so will also require broadening the methods we use to study
financial markets.  It is exciting to see the proliferation of new methods and approaches to studying financial markets and their regulation in the past few years. Here are just a few thoughts about some ways to do this.
  • We need to begin from empirical realities, whatever those are, and not from existing legal categories. The fact is that the legal categories were produced in response to an earlier time in financial markets and bear increasingly little relationship to the reality of markets today. Yet we persist in teaching, researching and thinking about financial regulation as if, for example, insurance, banking and securities were separate fields.  But if we start with what people in the markets tell us, and what we can observe about regulatory problems on the ground, and reason inductively about regulatory issues, rather than deductively from existing legal categories, we will produce analyses that are much more relevant to problems now.
  • Beginning with empirical realities means doing empirical research–talking to people, observing behavior, gathering every possible kind of data about what is actually happening.  This is tough work. Wouldn’t it be nice if we could just stick to our law books! No such luck.
  • We need as many different methodologies and disciplinary approaches to observing these realities as possible.  Economic data, of course. But also historical research, ethnographic research, sociological studies, even new kinds of theory, from alternative economic models to anthropological theory of exchange to political theories of regulation.
  • If we accept the premise of my previous post that markets by their nature are always combining with new subjects-the environment, politics, international institutions and so on–then I have more bad news: we need to start bringing the insights of other fields of law, from environmental law to international institutions, to bear on financial regulatory questions.  For example how can we make sense of the current boom in energy derivatives if we don’t know anything at all about the energy industry and how it is regulated globally?  Or how can we think about what strategies for international financial regulation will work without engaging with the insights of international law and institutions?  Or how can we evaluate the question of how bonuses should be regulated without engaging with debates in labor and employment law and policy? This probably will require collaborating with colleagues with expertise in these fields.
  • But the good news is that we don’t need to do it all alone.  And this brings me to one fruitful avenue for research: collaboration. For too long, legal thinking has been a fairly lonely exercise. But one approach to doing all of the above might be to find new ways of working collaboratively with practitioners in the markets and in government.  Thinking together about theory and practice can produce kinds of insights and solutions that neither side could imagine alone.  Of course how to do this, when the temporality, the standards of evaluation, and the political pressures of our careers as thinkers in the academy or in government or in the market are so different is not easy. Working through these challenges is its own challenge for our field.

January 9, 2012
by Annelise Riles
1 Comment

Broadening the field of financial regulation

Stock DataThis morning I participated in a fantastic panel at the American Association of Law Schools organized by Anna Gelpern and Eric Gerding on the state of legal scholarship about financial institutions. The question the organizers asked is, what is the most pressing focus for the field today?
I argued that we need to significantly broaden the field–its subject, its methods, and the range of debates it is addressing at the moment.


In this post, I will focus on Broadening the Subject:
  • Research needs to become far more seriously comparative. Dodd Frank is not the only thing happening in the world, people!  Elsewhere, very different solutions, different models of market regulation are being developed–and indeed there are different views of what the key problems are.  American scholars pay lip service to the globalization of financial regulation but too often focus only on US and UK law and assume that issues elsewhere are either pretty much the same, or just behind the US and the UK in development. But the days of US and UK dominance are soon over.  The world is far more complicated and more interesting than this.
  • Research needs to become far more focused on international regulatory problems.  Most regulatory problems are now cross-jurisdictional in some sense or another.  This means that new international regulatory projects–from the Financial Stability Board to efforts to coordinate countries excluded from the Basel consensus–are increasingly important.  Yet how much do most scholars in the field of financial regulation know about international law and institutions? Too often we seem to be reinventing the wheel in that field, without taking advantage of the wealth of knowledge about what works and doesn’t work in international institutions in analogous fields. (Stay tuned for my forthcoming paper on this)
  • We need to pay more attention to forms of regulation outside the purview of traditional state institutions.  As I argue in Collateral Knowledge, most market governance is not state-based. It is initiated and conducted by private parties.  How does this work? When does it work and when does it not? How does it interact with state regulation?
  • We need to focus much more on the politics of market regulation–on the changing political climate in which financial regulation is being produced, the differences in this climate in different jurisdictions, and its impact on the policy options available to regulators, the culture/esprit de corps among regulators, the ability to recruit top talent to the bureaucracy, and indeed the zone of what regulators imagine as possible.  Just as internationalizing the field demands reaching out to international law scholars, politicizing the field means reaching out to political scientists and scholars of law and politics working in other domains of law.
  • We need to pay attention to the ways in which the field of finance is always expanding to include other subjects. For example, markets in energy products bring finance into conversation with environmental law and politics, and financial crises and environmental crises mutually influence each other in many ways.
Tomorrow I will take up how we might broaden the methods we use to study financial regulation and what debates deserve our central attention.

February 22, 2011
by Annelise Riles
1 Comment

When Companies are Households

The scandal pages coming out of Hong Kong this month are full of intrigue about disputes among family members and various other possible “significant others” over the estate of tycoon Stanley Ho.  The Financial Times’ story on all this basically suggested that mixing family and company was an Asian characteristic, and not a particularly good one at that.  The point was that Asian companies need to separate business from family matters, and to separate the economic interests of each family member from the other if they are to succeed.

You hear this conventional wisdom from European and American experts all the time. In order to succeed, Asian companies need to make their companies look and function just like Euro-American ones.

Really? Now that two out of the three largest economies in the world are in Asia, perhaps it is time to consider European conventional wisdom on what a good company looks like. First, it is not as though shareholder governance always works out so great, as the recent financial debacles in the West have taught us.

But more importantly, writing from Tokyo at the moment, I am repeatedly struck by how much energy, creativity and real economic productivity resides in family-owned companies in this country (what the government euphemistically refers to as small and medium sized enterprises, even though some are actually enormous–as if it were an embarrassment that these companies are also families).  The open secret is that more than 90% of Japanese companies have the majority of their stock held by relatives.  More than 70% of Japanese employees work for such a company, and this does not count the unpaid labor of family members–the spouse who keeps the books, the son who manages the factory floor and so on.

I personally think this is a good thing, not an embarrassment at all. When I get depressed about the lack of innovation in large Japanese institutions–universities, companies, government–I have only to turn to the local restaurant or convenience store or florist to see examples of truly awe-inspiring creativity, intelligence, and perseverence under very difficult economic conditions.  When I get furious at the lack of women and young people in leadership positions in this country, I only have to go around the corner to see how the mom and pop owners of my local stationery store work side by side with their daughter and son-in-law with dignity and mutual respect (and of course the occasional screaming match).

What worries me, rather, is the way all this talk about needing to turn your family business into a “real” company with fancy financial investments and complex ownership structures is having disastrous effects on those who listen. One of the saddest chapters in the recent financial crisis in Japan has been the bankruptcy of so many such family businesses due not at all to poor performance in their business but to their investment in complicated financial instruments that the large banks convinced them they needed.

These companies do have very different economic challenges–one of the principal ones being what to do about succession when the founder or chairperson dies or retires, leaving behind either too many possible heirs or no heirs interested in the family business at all.  But what about the problem that worries the Financial Times so much, about people’s interests being mixed up with each other? Well, this is a problem in Euro-American shareholder governance as well, of course.  And there is no denying that in life in general, and not just in economic life, Chinese and Japanese people sometimes complain about the burdens that come with being so intimately connected with other people.  But there are advantages as well as disadvantages.  The Financial Times does not seem to recognize that the same sense of mutual connection that makes dividing assets difficult at death makes funding a startup relatively easy.  And many of the problems that plague Western companies–problems about how to align managers’ interests with the interests of shareholders–are hardly problems at all when the manager is the daughter of the founder.

And we might query whether Euro-American capitalism is really all that different, or whether the difference is rather one of degree. Many very successful public and private companies in the US and Europe are also largely family owned–from major newspapers to leading automobile manufacturers.

There are real issues here for policy: these companies are largely neglected by government policies long aimed at supporting the big industrial players.  It may also be that too many bureaucrats, trained in the West, are enamored with the Western model and not all that interested in how things work in their own country.  The company laws on the books in Japan for example–borrowed largely from American and European corporate law–don’t fit these companies’ needs or challenges very well.  Thinking about the economy as basically a bunch of household enterprises, incorporated formally as corporations, should cause us to think differently about a whole range of regulatory problems, from labor rights to the promotion of innovation to access to capital and taxation policy.  It also suggests the need for lots more research–we know surprisingly little about how these families/companies work, what role gender, and marriage, and inheritance tax, and social class, and immigration play in their fortunes and strategies.  We know too little also about how they globalize–how they set up operations overseas, and what contributes to success or failure.  And this all suggests the need for a much broader range of methodologies and specialities–notably anthropology and sociology, which have long traditions of expertise in kinship and social organization.  But the first step may be simply to recognize the obvious: so much of markets is really about households and families.

January 21, 2011
by Annelise Riles

What is Collateral Knowledge?

Collateral Knowledge - Book Cover

We’re now in the final countdown towards publication of my forthcoming book, Collateral Knowledge: Legal Reasoning in the Global Financial Markets. My publisher just unveiled the cover and I am really honored to have three people whose work I respect tremendously–Howell Jackson at Harvard Law, Bruce Carruthers at Northwestern’s Sociology department and Bill Maurer at UC Irvine’s Law School and Anthropology Department–saying some really nice things about the project on the back cover. The book can now be pre-ordered from Amazon and from the University of Chicago Press.

Someone recently asked me to explain why I picked this title for a book about private global governance. The book takes as its motif the workings of collateral in the financial markets. Participants in the global derivatives markets routinely post collateral with one another as assurance that they will make good on their promises before they trade. The regime of collateral maintenance and collateral calls proved surprisingly robust during the financial crisis, and tweaking the quantities and methods of accounting for collateral remains one of the principal policy proposals for financial regulation going forward.

I call the book Collateral Knowledge because I am interested in all the knowledge work that goes on behind the scenes to make collateral do its job–the computers, the documents, the legal arguments, the industry committees and much more. I argue that all this activity does far more work than first meets the eye. I go so far as to claim that it amounts to a kind of “private constitution”–a set of templates for action and institutional relationships that constrain market participants and govern how they act in ordinary times and in moments of crisis.

But I am really interested in collateral as one example of the role of legal expertise in financial markets. After all, collateral is basically a species of property law, and its management involves teams of legal experts around the world, from bureaucrats to professors to paralegals and practicing lawyers. I argue that law is “collateral knowledge” in the sense that it is often treated as something on the sidelines, under the radar screen, “collateral” to the main action of market transactions. And yet just like collateral in the financial markets, legal expertise turns out to play a very important role in market governance. Understanding how lawyers think–what kinds of problems they see, what kinds of solutions they imagine for their problems, how they work together, how they work with other market players, and how they interpret and react to regulatory efforts, helps us to understand a great deal that goes unnoticed about market governance (and its limitations as currently imagined).

And of course collateral knowledge is also a play on the concept of collateral damage–the notion that there are unintended but often drastic consequences to certain ways of thinking and doing things. Thinking about legal practice in global market governance helps us to think in fresh ways about why so much has gone wrong and what options are available for reform.

January 3, 2011
by Annelise Riles

Market Governance Is About People (And How They Think)

(This entry was originally posted on Jan. 3, 2011 on the Credit Slips website. I want to thank again Bob Lawless and Adam Levitin for inviting me to guest-blog daily on Credit Slips during the first week of January)

This week I want to raise with you a few thoughts about the way forward on financial regulation that have come out of interviewing and observing regulators in their interactions with market participants over ten years. My research has been mainly in Japan but involves some US components as well.

Before I get started though, the wider theme this week is going to be how vitally important it is to get out in the market and among regulators and talk to people rather than to just assume we know what a rational person in this or that role might think or do. I am continually amazed at how little we know about what regulators think and do; how little they know about what market participants think and do; how little market participants know about each other; how little the journalists know about any of this. And yet there is a growing body of very serious and solid empirical qualitative research out there based on long term observation and deep knowledge of particular markets that we could be relying on to answer these questions. Some examples: Doug Holmes on central bankers, Vincent Lepinay and Hiro Miyazaki on derivatives traders, and my work, and the work of Credit Slips’ own Anna Gelpern on lawyers. We need to start basing out regulatory policies on the empirical facts–on what we know about how real people in the markets think and act–not on what we imagine they might do.The keywords here are “people” and “thinking”.  Somehow we seem to have forgotten that markets and their regulation are all about real people, in real relationships that carry certain expectations about what doing the right thing might be–with regulators, with their competitors in the industry and their former classmates, with their customers, with their spouses and children, with their bosses and secretaries, and on and on–and certain sets of intellectual and mechanical tools for making sense of the realities they confront and making choices about what to do about them.

The disciplines of sociology and anthropology have a whole bunch of sophisticated tools for studying these things, and there is now a growing field out there called the anthropology of finance.  What anthropologists and sociologists know about market activity dovetails with behavioral economists’ insight that market behavior is not inherently rational or self-interested.  The next question is, what does shape market behavior? Anthropologists and sociologists study market culture, market institutions, and market thinking–everything from the kinds of technologies traders use to interpret the market to the relationships between regulators and market participants–to answer those questions. I discuss the insights of my own research and what anthropological approaches more generally have to offer in my book, Collateral Knowledge: Legal Reasoning in the Global Financial Markets, which will be out from the University of Chicago Press in March 2011.

If we really take in this simple fact about markets, all kinds of new opportunities to shape market activity come into view. So in the next few days I will throw out a few examples of how this perspective might contribute to current policy debates in the headlines. I look forward to your ideas and criticisms, and if any of you are attending the AALS meetings in San Francisco this week it would be great to talk in person too.

November 21, 2010
by Annelise Riles

When is a silo mentality a problem in financial markets?

Yesterday at the American Anthropological Association’s annual meeting I went to hear Gillian Tett, a journalist for the Financial Times, talk about how her own training in anthropology (like me, she holds a doctorate from Cambridge) had shaped her reporting on the derivatives markets and the financial crisis.  Tett eloquently explained how anthropologists’ attention to the difference between what people say and what they do, and how the ethnographic method–of observing people intensively over the long run rather than simply relying on public statements or even one to one interviews–had helped her to see the importance of credit derivatives before other newspapers began reporting on them and to sniff out problems in the credit derivatives markets ahead of the crash.  Tett argued that anthropologists’ holistic perspective, and their interest in rituals, in social and institutional practices, in latent hierarchies and in all that gets glossed as “irrational” in economics had an invaluable contribution to make to our understanding of modern finance and to policy debates.

Tett’s own diagnosis of the financial crisis focuses on what she calls “silos”–the way different financial institutions, and different teams within each financial institution, prevented anyone from seeing the big picture.  Stuck in their own little tribe’s group thinking, each team could not see the wider effects of their activities, or the way their perspective was only one among many.  Tett says she sees herself engaged in “silo-busting”–breaking down those barrios with a more holistic approach.

Tett is surely right that a silo mentality pervades certain aspects of the financial markets.  This is one of the ways finance is really like the rest of the world–all of us fail to see the limits of our own ways of thinking.  This is certainly true in the social sciences.  Anthropologists for example are for the most part utterly convinced that their own world view is better than others, and that they are misunderstood and under-appreciated by everyone else.  Economists’ self-confidence about their own discipline’s assumptions is legendary.  Paul Krugman has created a stir by asking whether economists’ over-confidence in their models might not have caused them to miss the financial crisis.  Like Krugman, I think Tett’s diagnosis should cause academics too to ask some hard questions about why we did not do more to highlight and critique the problems in the financial markets prior to the crash.  For myself, for example, fieldwork in the derivatives markets had convinced me long before the crash that all was not well in these markets. My husband (also an ethnographer of finance) and I often joked way back around 2002 that our research had convinced us not to put a penny of our own money in these markets.  But our own disciplinary silo made us feel that it was impossible to counter the enthusiasm for financial models out there in the economics departments, the business schools, the law schools, the corridors of regulatory institutions.  There surely was some truth to our sense that no one wanted to hear that markets were not rational in the sense assumed by the firms’ and regulators’ models.  But maybe we should have tried a bit harder; it turns out many other people also had doubts and thought they too were alone. What might have happened if we had all found a way to link our skepticisms?  The silo mentality is not just about a lack of knowledge.  It is also about a lack of confidence in one’s ability to communicate with people outside the silo.  I don’t think this is anthropologists’ problem alone.  When I ask many of my research subjects why they don’t tell regulators the full story, have just shrugged, “they wouldn’t understand.”
With funding from the Tobin Project and the Clarke Program in East Asian Law and Culture, Tom Baker at Penn Law School and I have sponsored a string of workshops aimed at breaking down disciplinary barriers and getting the conversation about markets going between economists, sociologists and anthropologists.[1] It has been exciting to see how much interest there is on all sides. One of the positive outcomes of the crisis is a greater sense of curiosity about perspectives outside our own silos and a greater commitment to building new conversations.
Still, I wonder if it is always and everywhere a good idea to break down specialized ways of thinking and replace them with a holistic approach.  Take lawyers and back office staff inside the big banks.  As I have written about elsewhere, they lack the big picture: there are lots of things about finance they don’t understand and this sets them apart from traders.  But precisely because they don’t think like traders, they can also evaluate the activities of a trading room with some critical distance.  After all, if they were indoctrinated into the same assumptions as traders they probably would not catch the limitations in traders’ logic that can have disastrous risk management consequences.  So having lots of different groups that think differently from one another with a stake and a role in making decisions is also an important component of financial stability.  In practice, dealing with people who think differently can be a huge pain in the neck–traders don’t much like back office staff meddling in their affairs and vice versa.  Collaborating across differences in expertise is laborious, time consuming, and even wasteful of time and resources, and everyone complains about the other guys constantly.  Yet the requirement that different groups with different forms of expertise collaborate in making financial decisions is a kind of sociological fuse box, a way of slowing things down when they start to snowball out of control.  Sometimes waste and redundancy is a good thing.  The benefits of this fuse box would be lost if everyone had the full picture: traders with back office expertise can more easily circumvent regulatory checks; back office staff with too much training in finance begin to buy into the trader’s world view.
So maybe instead of silo busting, what we really need is more mandates that we collaborate, across our differences. This is true in the academy as much as in finance.

[1] The first Workshop on Behavioral and Institutional Research and Financial Services Regulatory Reform took place at Penn Law in the Fall of 2009. The second one took place in Washington, DC in June 2010. The third one will take place at the Cornell University Law School in April 2011.

November 1, 2010
by Annelise Riles

Building a Culture of Good Decision-making in Markets

Back OfficeDoes good financial regulation only happen in legislatures, regulators’ offices, and at international meetings of central bankers? What about what goes on between lawyers and their clients, between back office clerks and front office traders? Inside computer systems? What about the mountains of documentation, the procedures surrounding confirmations and disputes? What about all the people, and their tools, that make up a market?

One way to think about this is to ask, what are we trying to achieve, when we talk about creating more stable, efficient, fair financial markets? The answer is that we are trying to change the way things are actually done inside the market. Done by real people, in real situations.

At any moment, thousands of people around the world—from managing directors to administrative assistants and everyone in between—are making decisions, making choices, taking actions—file this document, call Leslie or Hiroshi about this deal, interpret this contract clause this way, buy this company, call the PR firm to see if they could put an ad in the newspaper about this political issue, have lunch with this regulator, and on and on. And those millions of actions, those decisions, are all we mean by markets. When we say we want more stable markets, we really mean that we want to shift people’s ordinary actions.

So all this regulation is just an effort to change real people’s actions, every day, sometimes in big ways, but often in small ways. The next time a middle level staffer at a ratings agency has a gut feeling that the rating of a bank does not fully reflect the bank’s exposure, we hope they will take the time to ask a few more questions, and then pass those questions on to superiors who will do the same. The next time a lawyer for a hedge fund is asked to find a technical legal interpretation of cross-borders securities laws that will limit their client’s fiduciary duties to their own investment clients, we hope they will take the time to ask whether such an interpretation really conforms with the spirit of the law, and to push their client on whether such an interpretation is really in the client’s own long term best interest. The next time a dispute between counter-parties to a swap transaction develops, we hope that the people working inside each of those hedge funds, companies, or banks think work out a negotiated solution rather than deploying “the nuclear option” with domino effects throughout the market.

What do these steps look like, to someone in the thick of things? They can require a little bit of courage—a choice to make just a little bit of trouble for a transaction by asking for more information or raising an issue with a superior. They can require a little bit of extra effort—a choice to take a little more time to go check the facts on a problem when you would rather head out early on a Friday afternoon. They can require a little bit of vision and creativity—to find a win-win solution to a conflict or to see one’s own personal interests, and the institution’s interests, in a longer term perspective. They can require some tools, like workable informal dispute resolution protocols developed by industry associations.

Now in fact, good decisions like these happen all the time. They even happened right in the midst of the last financial crisis. Things could have been far worse than they were in 2008 had not many thousands of people taken reasonable steps to bring whatever stability they could to their little corner of the market. And it could happen a lot more.

What bothers me about much of the talk about financial regulation is that it proceeds as if markets participants were rats in a scientific experiment, motivated only by simple desire for immediate gratification or fear of pain: We will either beat you over the head with penalties if you don’t comply with our securities laws or offer you cash incentives if you do comply (think, the new obscenely large incentives for whistleblowers to now make money on informing the government about the shady practices they made money engaging in before). In fact my ten years of research in the derivatives markets has convinced me beyond a shadow of a doubt that this view of market participants as selfish, brutish and stupid is not an accurate picture. There are many kinds of people working in many capacities in the market, with many different, complicated motivations. But all the people I know, money is only one such motivation. Others include respect from peers, a sense of intellectual challenge and fun, and yes, the satisfaction that one has built something good and done the right thing. If I were to ask many of my informants in the markets why they did the right thing in this or that case, I doubt the first thing that would come to mind would be “because a regulator said I should.”

So what does this all mean? It means that government regulation is one important route to changing markets by changing the actions people take in markets, but it is not the only route. We need much more conversation about what happens, in those key situations, when a person at a critical (but ordinary) juncture in the market chooses Path A or Path B. What are the pressures? What are the options? What influences those choices? What resources do employees need to make the best choices—more time? more knowledge? More support from peer groups? And yes (but not only), financial incentives and fear of penalties? We need to start building a culture of good decision-making.

December 8, 2009
by Annelise Riles

Anthropological Studies of Financial Markets


Why is it important?


Cornell Conference on Cultural Approaches to Asian Financial Markets in 2002

Other scholars working in this tradition:

  • Hirokazu Miyazaki (Cornell) (bio)
  • Bill Maurer (Irvine) (bio)
  • Doug Holmes (Binghamton) (bio)
  • Vincent Lepinay (MIT) (bio)
  • Karen Ho (Minnesota) (bio)



Penn Conference


Techniques of Hope (Link)

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