June 25, 2013
by Annelise Riles

Managing Regulatory Arbitrage: An Alternative to Harmonization

How can the Conflict of Laws achieve for international financial regulation what international agreements have so far failed to achieve? A short summary of my forthcoming paper in the Cornell International Law Journal on the subject, in Risk&Regulation Magazine, makes the case.


Managing Regulatory Arbitrage: an alternative to harmonization (.pdf)

October 2, 2012
by Annelise Riles

Market Totalitarianism

AIG Tower, Seoul

One of the big financial news stories of the week was that the US government will get its money back on the sale of AIG stocks. There is actually a debate about whether this is an accurate description of the state of affairs. But what interests me most is the fact–apparently agreed upon by both the champions and the critics of the TARP program–that the government’s return on its investment is the arbiter of the success or failure of the TARP policy. The state is now an investor, and its success or failure is evaluated according to the terms we apply to any other investor. What model of the state is this?
What fascinates me about this is that the state is a player in the market, to be evaluated on pretty much the same terms as we would evaluate any other market participant. This is a new kind of politics, not just a new kind of regulatory economics.
So what? I think this is actually a very big deal–something that should get political theorists going, and should engage us all in debates about the nature of democracy, or perhaps post-democracy, in an era in which states have imploded into markets and vice versa. I have a new paper coming out next spring on this subject in American Anthropologist and the title gives away my own views on this emerging politics: Market Totalitarianism.
I presented this paper last week as a keynote lecture at a conference at McGill Law Faculty entitled “Law Beyond the State.” A smattering of responses I got:

“You’re crazy.”
“You’re wild.”
“I wouldn’t be so radical.”
“People love what you do but they wouldn’t follow you there themselves.”
‘Your paper did not leave anyone indifferent…These slightly surreal moments are one of the great blessings of life.”
And weirdest of all, “Listening to you is an aesthetic experience.”

But that isn’t the worst: One of my own colleagues at an internal faculty workshop told me I should “just go hang out in the Hamptons with Romney and the other crazies.”
It is a sad commentary on how truly boring the legal academy has become when I count as outrageous. What seems to bother people are two things:

1. I am suggesting that there might actually be unintended consequences to centrist lefties’ eternal defense of the state (nothing new I thought here–see Todorov, Lefort, and any of the leftists with experiences of totalitarian states under their belts) and

2. I am suggesting that the techniques of private law, which we have devoted generations to showing up as endlessly malleable, and worse, politically suspect, might offer an ironic space for creative response to the current condition. Here is a very thoughtful version of the latter point:

“I found your diagnosis of the market and debt most compelling and was drawn to your use of Mauss and Davy. What I found surprising — and I suppose that is the Davy direction rather than the Mauss direction of your analysis — is that you ended up hitching your flag to the mast of the reciprocity of the contractual form (sounding remarkably like Ernie Weinrib in the end) rather than revisiting more insistently the gift relationship. In other words, I was expecting you to tell us that, in effect, capitalism had collapsed upon itself through the involution of debt that you described …and that the sphere of gift, relegated to the margins by market exchange, would have to be reinvested.”

That is indeed what one would expect of an anthropologist! Arguing for gifts instead of law.  What I find challenging about Georges Davy is that he refuses the distinction between the two.

September 8, 2012
by Annelise Riles

The emerging academic consensus on the future of financial regulation

I am in Freiburg, Germany for a conference at the Max-Planck Institute on Regulation and Law Enforcement after the financial crisis.  Freiburg is the greenest city in Germany, I am told proudly by our hosts: 100% of the energy used in the city comes from renewable sources. Everywhere you see small systems installed in the streams to collect little bits of energy that are pooled to supply local energy needs.  Even visitors are supplied with a public transport pass on hotel check-in and advised to take the tram, bicycle or walk to our appointments. The air is clean and crisp and, in marked contrast to my own country, people look remarkably fit and relaxed. If Freiburg can do it, why not Ithaca?


At the conference, I can sense a palpable shift in the way scholars are beginning to think about the financial crisis as compared to several years ago. There is a breadth of approaches–geography, sociology, anthropology, experimental psychology, criminology–and scholars are engaging in direct, detailed and fruitful conversation with practitioners.  Everyone seems to have far more patience for approaches and perspectives different from their own–perhaps we have all been chastened by the limits of our own disciplinary viewpoints! The practitioners themselves are more diverse in their views than in the past.  Some think the government is doing a great job, but others (including former government regulators) have an extremely dark and pessimistic view of how things are going on the inside, and they are not afraid to say so. The consensus of the conference was clearly that, four years after the start of the financial crisis, we have not made nearly enough progress in making the kinds of regulatory and institutional changes needed to prevent the next one.  We joked that each of us outdid the next in our presentations with ever-darker pictures of the political impediments to regulatory reform, the structural problems such as a lack of self-confidence and incentives against forceful action among regulators and prosecutors, and the limits of the securities and criminal laws for addressing problematic behavior. I talked about a different level of problem–the rise since 2008 of a new mode of state managerialism I call Market Totalitarianism (which gives you a sense of what I think of it!) More on that in a next post.


But the real reason I am posting here is that I met a remarkable young legal anthropologist, Johanna Mugler, who is just beginning her teaching career at the University of Bern and working on the politics and epistemology of taxation.  She told me what this blog means to her and her students and chided me for not posting more frequently as of late! It’s an honor to have a conversation anywhere with imaginative young scholars like Johanna–and if this blog can be a venue of that kind of conversation with so many readers like her, well, that is all the inspiration I need to get cracking again. Thank you, Johanna!

May 16, 2012
by Annelise Riles

Is this capitalism? If not, then what is it?

This post was originally published as part of a “Theorizing the Contemporary – Finance”  forum on the Cultural Anthropology website.


“Business Leaders of Today are Not Capitalists,” shouted the Financial Times headline several weeks ago. The article went on to describe how, inside the largest financial institutions, leaders are today chosen not for their entrepreneurial skills, their instinct for risk, their interest in making money even, but for their ability to schmooze and negotiate with government bureaucrats. Those with connections to governmental elites from their school days who have proven themselves agile at institutional and bureaucratic politics are the new titans of the economy.

Why? The article doesn’t go there, but I think the answer is obvious.  Today, money is made primarily from government give-aways of one kind or another—subsidies, bail-outs, regulatory regimes favorable to industry.  The game is now not about making markets but ensuring you get as much as possible from the state, or at least more than your competitors. Contrary to a decade ago when industry leaders decried the “nanny state,” today they line up to be coddled.

So what should we anthropologists of markets make of this new reality? And what of the fact that it doesn’t take an anthropologist to get this far: the FT, bastion of mainstream opinion in the financial industry, has already done the analytical work. What can we add to the mix?

To my mind, the core question and contribution anthropologists can make at this moment is similar to the contribution that Hayek and the Vienna School made at the close of World War II when, as today, the consensus about markets, states, and their relationships was shattered and the ideological field was wide open.  As Foucault recounts in his lectures on biopolitics, those guys fashioned a new consensus, a set of givens, and worked hard to turn them into the hegemony they became. The results spoke for themselves: until today it was largely impossible to think outside the view that markets were more legitimate than states and that state intervention in markets should be corrective, and hence reactive and limited, but not “dirigiste”.

We could have a vibrant and exciting debate about what the contours of this new consensus should look like, as a descriptive project and as a normative project.
For example, half of me finds myself rooting for the good old Hayekian days when markets were markets, losers lost, and innovation was the way to profit maximization.

So I was excited to see the petition by Public Citizen to the Federal Reserve to break up the banks that are deemed Too Big To Fail.

The occupy wall street folks made a similar proposal.  The argument in a nutshell is, “you told us that the rules were that capitalism produces winners and losers and that tough love toward the losers ultimately raises all boats.  You forced us, the workers, the small businesses, the underemployed, to live by those rules, so the least you should do is live by those rules now.  Allowing firms that are too big to fail to exist is an admission that there are two sets of capitalist rules–rules for the insiders and rules for the rest of us.”

One of the reasons I like this proposal is that, having studied the Too Big to Fail (TBTF) issue quite extensively from the vantage point of fieldwork among government technocrats, I can confidently say that most technocrats agree that this would be the best solution. But they believe that it is politically unpalatable because ultimately those TBTF institutions control the political process and will make sure that legislators do not allow technocrats to stick to market rules.  I bet the Fed was actually really really happy to get this petition in fact.  So here is a kind of political initiative on the part of the citizenry that we anthropologists could champion, in part because it dispenses with the usual divide between technocratic elites and ordinary citizens who are assumed to be well-meaning but know nothing about finance. This initiative potentially gives technocrats the power to do what they “know” to be right (from the vantage point of their Hayekian ideology) and pits technocrats and citizens together against the big banks.

That is one way to go. But my instinct is that as tempting as this may be, we should be doing something even more bold.  My guess is that we should not just hold the Hayekians to their Hayekian bargains but rather recognize that the world is changing and set out to build the new consensus.  And here there are all kinds of other interesting developments we might want to investigate and weave into a new kind of analysis. For example, what do we make of the sudden prominence of religion in debates about capitalism–not only in “alternative” forms of capitalism but right at the heart of North Atlantic economies? And what do we make of the fact that spokespersons for mainstream religion, who, in our social theory since Weber, are imagined as supporters of capitalism, are emerging as powerful critics? I am thinking here of the statements by both the Pope and the Archbishop of Canterbury in support of Occupy Wall Street. In Japan also one hears many allusions to Buddhism, Shinto and other religious traditions in political debate about market regulation. There are many possible understandings of such statements but I wonder if along with the collapse of confidence in rational modes of risk management, prediction and planning we are seeing the beginnings of a new appreciation for the metaphysical and existential issues posed by markets, the kinds of issues anthropologists and sociologists of finance since Weber have eloquently demonstrated. What happens to the ideological consensus of market/state relations when such issues come to the forefront of market participants’ own consciousness?

Another set of issues have to do with the decline of the North Atlantic economies and the rise of Asia in particular.  How does this new reality, accepted as such by all of my informants, and the ensuing debate they are having about multiple forms of capitalism, the relationship between capitalism and culture and so on, reconfigure the possibilities for a new post-Hayekian consensus about what makes markets work and why? These are just two small examples of how and why this is an exciting moment to be an anthropologist of markets.  As one of my informants put it, we are in a counter-cyclical business: when things are really bad for everyone else, our work is full of possibilities.

January 18, 2012
by Annelise Riles

Broadening the methods for studying financial regulation

In my earlier post I discussed some ways we need to broaden the subject of financial
regulation.  Doing so will also require broadening the methods we use to study
financial markets.  It is exciting to see the proliferation of new methods and approaches to studying financial markets and their regulation in the past few years. Here are just a few thoughts about some ways to do this.
  • We need to begin from empirical realities, whatever those are, and not from existing legal categories. The fact is that the legal categories were produced in response to an earlier time in financial markets and bear increasingly little relationship to the reality of markets today. Yet we persist in teaching, researching and thinking about financial regulation as if, for example, insurance, banking and securities were separate fields.  But if we start with what people in the markets tell us, and what we can observe about regulatory problems on the ground, and reason inductively about regulatory issues, rather than deductively from existing legal categories, we will produce analyses that are much more relevant to problems now.
  • Beginning with empirical realities means doing empirical research–talking to people, observing behavior, gathering every possible kind of data about what is actually happening.  This is tough work. Wouldn’t it be nice if we could just stick to our law books! No such luck.
  • We need as many different methodologies and disciplinary approaches to observing these realities as possible.  Economic data, of course. But also historical research, ethnographic research, sociological studies, even new kinds of theory, from alternative economic models to anthropological theory of exchange to political theories of regulation.
  • If we accept the premise of my previous post that markets by their nature are always combining with new subjects-the environment, politics, international institutions and so on–then I have more bad news: we need to start bringing the insights of other fields of law, from environmental law to international institutions, to bear on financial regulatory questions.  For example how can we make sense of the current boom in energy derivatives if we don’t know anything at all about the energy industry and how it is regulated globally?  Or how can we think about what strategies for international financial regulation will work without engaging with the insights of international law and institutions?  Or how can we evaluate the question of how bonuses should be regulated without engaging with debates in labor and employment law and policy? This probably will require collaborating with colleagues with expertise in these fields.
  • But the good news is that we don’t need to do it all alone.  And this brings me to one fruitful avenue for research: collaboration. For too long, legal thinking has been a fairly lonely exercise. But one approach to doing all of the above might be to find new ways of working collaboratively with practitioners in the markets and in government.  Thinking together about theory and practice can produce kinds of insights and solutions that neither side could imagine alone.  Of course how to do this, when the temporality, the standards of evaluation, and the political pressures of our careers as thinkers in the academy or in government or in the market are so different is not easy. Working through these challenges is its own challenge for our field.

January 11, 2012
by Annelise Riles

The Contract as Machine

Yesterday I spoke about Collateral Knowledge at the Saint Louis University Law School.  One member of the audience, a former general counsel of a hedge fund with extensive experience with ISDA agreements, raised a great question:

Q: You talk about how ISDA agreements create a kind of settled system of private market governance outside the purview of the state. But there is so much that is undecided or in flux about ISDA agreement. All the key terms are in the attached schedules and other negotiable aspects of the agreement and those are left to the parties. So it is not nearly standardized enough.  (The implication of the question for the thesis of the book, then, was that private law beyond the state may be much less effective, or authoritative, than I suggest).

Great question. Here is my answer in a nutshell.

It is absolutely correct that, from the point of view of users of ISDA agreements such as this speaker, all the important stuff is in the schedules and other negotiable portions of the agreement. And that is the very intent of technologies like the master agreement–to draw users’ attention to certain questions, only.  In fact, I found that many users of ISDA master agreements don’t even know what the rest of the document says in much detail–they just focus on the parts that need to be filled out. This is why I describe the contract as a machine (something meant to be used) rather than a text (something meant to be read).

However, your point really just confirms the power of this technology! Because look what it has done–it has convinced you that the only really salient issues, the only important issues, are the ones it intends you to focus on.  But in fact there are many other potentially significant issues that are entirely determined by the boilerplate, and industry practice, effectuated through this document, is to treat those issues as entirely settled and noncontestable.  This is what Gramsci calls hegemony: when something is so much of a given, so generally accepted, that it is unthinkable as a potential source of conflict or contestation. Talk about a tremendous political achievement.

January 9, 2012
by Annelise Riles
1 Comment

Broadening the field of financial regulation

Stock DataThis morning I participated in a fantastic panel at the American Association of Law Schools organized by Anna Gelpern and Eric Gerding on the state of legal scholarship about financial institutions. The question the organizers asked is, what is the most pressing focus for the field today?
I argued that we need to significantly broaden the field–its subject, its methods, and the range of debates it is addressing at the moment.


In this post, I will focus on Broadening the Subject:
  • Research needs to become far more seriously comparative. Dodd Frank is not the only thing happening in the world, people!  Elsewhere, very different solutions, different models of market regulation are being developed–and indeed there are different views of what the key problems are.  American scholars pay lip service to the globalization of financial regulation but too often focus only on US and UK law and assume that issues elsewhere are either pretty much the same, or just behind the US and the UK in development. But the days of US and UK dominance are soon over.  The world is far more complicated and more interesting than this.
  • Research needs to become far more focused on international regulatory problems.  Most regulatory problems are now cross-jurisdictional in some sense or another.  This means that new international regulatory projects–from the Financial Stability Board to efforts to coordinate countries excluded from the Basel consensus–are increasingly important.  Yet how much do most scholars in the field of financial regulation know about international law and institutions? Too often we seem to be reinventing the wheel in that field, without taking advantage of the wealth of knowledge about what works and doesn’t work in international institutions in analogous fields. (Stay tuned for my forthcoming paper on this)
  • We need to pay more attention to forms of regulation outside the purview of traditional state institutions.  As I argue in Collateral Knowledge, most market governance is not state-based. It is initiated and conducted by private parties.  How does this work? When does it work and when does it not? How does it interact with state regulation?
  • We need to focus much more on the politics of market regulation–on the changing political climate in which financial regulation is being produced, the differences in this climate in different jurisdictions, and its impact on the policy options available to regulators, the culture/esprit de corps among regulators, the ability to recruit top talent to the bureaucracy, and indeed the zone of what regulators imagine as possible.  Just as internationalizing the field demands reaching out to international law scholars, politicizing the field means reaching out to political scientists and scholars of law and politics working in other domains of law.
  • We need to pay attention to the ways in which the field of finance is always expanding to include other subjects. For example, markets in energy products bring finance into conversation with environmental law and politics, and financial crises and environmental crises mutually influence each other in many ways.
Tomorrow I will take up how we might broaden the methods we use to study financial regulation and what debates deserve our central attention.

October 28, 2011
by Annelise Riles
1 Comment

Rethinking “Too Big To Fail”

Last month I published a paper rethinking the Too Big To Fail question from the point of view of anthropological theories of debt.  You might say that while modern financial economics focuses on credit, modern anthropology of exchange focuses on debt. The latter has developed very sophisticated theoretical and empirical insights about the politics and social practice of debts and indebtedness. As I argue in the chapter, unlike economists who regard “Too Big to Fail” scenarios as the exception to proper market relations, anthropologists’ empirical research shows that these are actually the norm. And not only are they the norm, but in fact social actors seek to become “Too Big to Fail.”  If you are so indebted to so many parties that you cannot be allowed to fail, anthropology tells us, you are actually the most powerful person around.  This view of the world probably better characterizes the realities of current finance, in which banks, like exchange actors anthropologists study, see becoming Too Big to Fail as something to be achieved, and in which the presence of such actors is also the norm, not the exception.
In the paper, I also show how anthropological theories of relational personhood and exchange relationships actually illuminate a number of aspects of the legal nature of corporate personhood and help us gain some critical perspective on the relationship between corporations and nation-states.
It is a new set of ideas for me and so I would really welcome feedback!

May 30, 2011
by Annelise Riles

The Nightmare of Transparency

In a recent Business Week article, Hernando de Soto is once again peddling his simplistic view of property rights as the path to pure market transparency. He argues, to considerable journalistic and popular acclaim, that the problem with derivatives markets is simply that property rights are not sufficiently well defined and standardized.  Bring in good old fashion property law and related tools such as title registration, he argues, and the markets will magically clean up.

As I discuss at some length in my book, the proposal is preposterous from the point of view of anyone who knows anything about property law. Property rights are never clear in the way that non lawyers imagine them to be.  As I show with regard to actual cases of property claims in the derivatives markets, as is the case with ordinary property rights, there is tremendous room for interpretation, confusion, conflict and gamesmanship within the language of property law.

De Soto should know better.  He claims to have come upon his insist through field research, and I would venture that even a few casual conversations with any legal expert in the derivatives markets would reveal how property sets the stage for conflict of a different kind rather than bringing pure clarity to things.  But since I have laid out the problems with De Soto’s claim that property achieves transparency in the book, let me ask a different question instead: is transparency tout court always a good thing?

One of the painful rituals of daily life in Tokyo at the moment is the daily review of government statistics on radiation levels.  In response to complaints that it was not sufficiently transparent about radiation risks, the government is now drowning us in numbers.  There are readings taken by each city, each prefecture, and by the national government for each city and prefecture.  There are numbers for each kind of radiation–cesium, iodine, and so on.  Of course the numbers produced by the national and local governments rarely match up.  And we are given no explanation of these numbers since that would be the biased view of government officials–it is just purely transparent information. Truck loads and truck loads of it.

So we the citizens are left to ask ourselves every day how we translate these numbers into an answer to questions like, is it safe for my four year old to play outside today? Is it safe for me to drink the milk or the water? What are the odds of my dying of cancer as a result of my exposure to the rain this summer? And so on.

My husband and I both have PhDs in social scientific subjects and are used to working with data. And yet the deeper we try to dig into these numbers–to compare them for example against the safety standards set by international bodies–the more confused things become. First, it is as if just about every international organization, and every local data collecting body in Japan, has its own system of units.  Conversion between these units turns out to be basically impossible as they are apples and oranges, measuring different things. But some of the problem is simply the violence of probabilities. Learning for example that exposure increases cancer risk by a certain percentage tells you nothing about your own situation since it is based on averages, across global populations (is the average nuclear victim an eighty year old Swede or a twenty year old Bangladeshi?).  And in the case of nuclear accidents we have so little data anyway that those probabilities are probably best described as guesses.

But even though we know that these numbers tell us next to nothing, we can’t stop ourselves. The information is there, it is transparent, so we feel almost compelled to enter into it. Its analysis becomes the daily ritual of our worry.  Did iodine levels go up or down compared to yesterday? And what does that mean, anyway relative to how much iodine our child absorbed, or how much he can absorb?  Every day this analysis of the numbers ends with the same sick feeling in the stomach of total confusion, total lack of clarity about an issue of paramount importance to our family. I experience this daily ritual as its own kind of political violence.  It is as if this absurd cacophony of purely ordered data is taunting me, leaving me all the more exhausted and demoralized.

Now I realize this transparency nightmare seems quite far away from the wonders of property law de Soto would prescribe for the derivatives markets. Yet it is not so different in fact.  After all, market transparency, which is what he advocates, is just a matter of the availability of data. If the data is available, the theory goes, some smart people will make sense of it all. And yet data itself is only meaningful within a framework.  Our problem is that we lack a framework for analyzing the numbers because the people who produced the numbers themselves also lack a singular and coherent framework.  In that situation, the consumer of transparency is saddled with the absurd burden of making meaning–making something standard and comparable–out of what by definition is not standard.  This is often the case in the derivatives markets as well.  In the derivatives markets traders often dodge the pure impossibility of the task by just doing what everyone else is doing–using the same model, the same pricing tool as the next guy, even if we all know its limitations. That is called a herd mentality and we have seen its disastrous effects.

May 1, 2011
by Annelise Riles
1 Comment

How can we better harness the insights of different disciplines to address market reform?

Last week we convened another meeting of our working group of economists, anthropologists, lawyers, psychologists and policy makers interested in how our disciplines could work together in new ways to solve market problems.  It is a very smart, high-powered group of creative people who truly have the best interest of the national and global economy at heart.  And the policy makers are brilliant, dedicated individuals who know how things work on the inside, and who think broadly about the issues.  Once again, our meeting was supported by the Tobin Project, as well as by the Clarke Program in East Asian Law and Culture at Cornell Law School.

The theme this time was health care insurance reform and we did some hard thinking about what our disciplines could say, practically, about what kind of insurance exchanges might help different kinds of consumers make the best choices possible for them.


But there is another running conversation at these meetings about how the disciplines can be reconfigured to work better together in the future. The disciplinary truce worked out in the early twentieth century was a kind of cold war-like division of the territory: anthropologists study exotic others, sociologists study deviant groups at home, psychologists study individuals, economists study markets, and so on. Thank goodness that along the way we learned that all these elements are inter-related and that each of these disciplines has much to say about every aspect of life. So how else could they work together?


One model that is emerging from our meetings is a kind of production model, beginning with original insights and moving all the way to the incorporation of ideas into policy.  Eric Johnson, a distinguished psychologist teaching at the Columbia Business School, suggested that anthropologists could provide the insight (based on ethnographic research), economists could provide the models, and psychologists could provide the data (based on experiments)–and that we need data and numbers to convince policy makers.


Another model seems to be a model of internal change within fields.  Peter Spiegler, an economist at U Mass Boston and one of the most truly original scholars I have ever encountered, suggested that economics needs to start incorporating ethnography into its own method of research, rather than just taking insights (about trust, or reciprocity or whatever) from anthropology and modeling them in the traditional way.  I argued that anthropologists, conversely, need to learn to value simplicity as well as complexity, and to communicate openly and clearly and generously with people in government and in other fields, as economists and psychologists have learned to do.


There are a lot of things that infuriate me about anthropology and anthropologists.  But at the end of the day, some of our most basic insights are sorely lacking in the policy world and could make an enormous contribution to market reform.  Here are just a few obvious ones:

-Asking about the givens: noticing what is so important that it is just taken for granted by everyone, including perhaps even the researcher.  For example, at our meeting, we were deep into how to structure consumer choices about insurance and one anthropologist asked “why do we value choice so much in the first place?”

-thinking about the global dimensions of even the most domestic policy problems, and thinking comparatively about policy problems. For example, what could we learn about health reform from Japan, or Singapore, or South Africa?

-thinking about the range of actors and interests involved in law reform.  For exaple once a law like the health care act is passed the story is not over–it has to be implemented by armies of regulators, interpreted in practice by physicians, drug companies and insurers, used by consumers…how do all these people come together in practice?

-reflexivity–realizing that academics are part of the picture and bear some responsibility for what we advocate for, and its consequences, intended and unintended.

Insight rather than data–ultimately ethnography gives you a picture, and a story, and helps you to to become aware of the aspects of a problem you may have ignored altogether in constructing your model or your policy proposal.  Private companies have grasped the value of this kind of insight and are employing ethnographers in large numbers to do market research and study organizational culture within their companies but we have a ways to go before it is adopted as broadly in policy circles.


What do you think are the strengths and weaknesses of each discipline in thinking about market reform? How do you think fields like economics, anthropology and law could better work together to address market reform?


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